Earlier this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the Kursk offensive had not been discussed with his allies in advance. “A few months ago, if someone had heard that we were planning such an operation, they would have said that it was unrealistic and crossed a very sensitive red line drawn by Russia,” Zelensky told a press conference. The statements came in response to the Pentagon’s surprise at the success of the Ukrainian offensive on Russian territory.
In recent times, Ukraine has expressed displeasure at what it sees as excessive interference by the Biden administration in its military tactics, as well as criticism of decisions not to follow plans outlined by the White House. These criticisms rarely come directly from American leaders, but are often conveyed through nearby media outlets. The Washington Post and the The New York TimesAccording to Ukrainian government sources.
Recently, the Economist published a detailed article on the origins of the Kursk operation, in which a source close to the head of the Ukrainian armed forces, Oleksandr Chirsky, said, “Two previous operations were vetoed by the West. One was revealed to the Russians, and in the other case, we were forced to abandon the mission. Without losing the support of the United States, Blinken and Biden Inspired by the Israeli example of ignoring the consultation, Ukraine decided to pursue an independent strategy.
“We had to take action before the Russians noticed,” said one source EconomistThis explains the growing distrust between Kiev and Washington. By choosing to act independently, Ukraine surprised not only Putin, but also part of the West, which is why the attack received little public attention, and is still viewed with some caution. The article itself Economist It described the move as “desperate” in a “desperate situation” for Ukraine.
Remembrance of Bagmuth
This is not the first time significant differences have arisen between Ukraine and its Western allies. Given the enormous financial and military support the West has given Kiev, it is understandable that it wants to influence strategic decisions. However, Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and freedoms by Ukrainians. It might be paternalism at best to try to lead them as if they were inexperienced—which certainly didn’t sit well with leaders like Chirsky and Zelensky.
Zelensky and the Pentagon have been at odds since the start of the conflict, despite a firm consensus against a common enemy that violates international law. The United States has repeatedly warned of an imminent Russian attack on multiple fronts, but Kiev initially ignored it, believing that the attack would be limited to the Donbass without an attack on the capital or an invasion from Crimea.
Realizing his mistake, Zelensky quickly replaced those responsible for territorial defense in the occupied provinces, accusing them of treason. The successes of the Ukrainian operations in Kherson and Kharkiv in the summer of 2022 – under the command of Chirsky – led to different interpretations of the direction of the war and fueled new friction. In the Pentagon, Chirsky’s insistence on defending Bagmut, sacrificing many men and resources, was never understood, and frustration grew with Ukrainian attacks on Crimea and Rostov aimed at weakening Russian military infrastructure.
Dangerous information leaks
Washington had a different view of the war and wanted a campaign that could be easily “sold” to the American public, knowing that support for Ukraine could weaken over time, especially with the influence of the Republican Party and its ties to Putin. . The idea of a summer 2023 “counteroffensive” was not considered by Washington, but was advertised as almost doomed to failure before it could be implemented.
Through the American press, the details of every point of attack, every future maneuver and every planned course of action were publicized. Naturally, the Russians were informed first, thanks to their espionage skills, but information was widely available from sources such as The New York Times. This allowed Russian forces to prepare and fortify strategic locations such as the Dnieper River crossing at Dokmok, Vasilivka, and the city of Kherson.
Ukraine, without numerical superiority or significant air support, stepped forward under pressure from Washington and had to prove to the Russians that they could still turn the tide of the war. However, with a high human and military cost, the effect was modest. Ukrainian troops encountered well-prepared fortifications at each advance, and the so-called “Surovikin Line” seemed to constantly adjust the intentions of General Zalushny, who was in charge of later operations.
The modest advances achieved had the merit of being barely recognized by the US and the West. They expected to see a great victory as Napoleon entered Moscow, but the reality on the ground was very different.
Zelensky’s decision
When the Pentagon recommended firing Chirsky for continuing to ignore U.S. directives, Zelensky made a clear decision: He named Zalushny as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army to replace him. The move was a warning to Washington, establishing a “red line” in relations between the two countries. Since then, Ukraine has faced negative news, predicting potential battlefield disasters, resource shortages and pessimistic analyzes of Russian advances in areas such as Wuhleder, Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. Reports from the field frequently highlight complaints from Ukrainian soldiers about lack of supplies and organization.
Despite this, Ukraine is fighting surprisingly well. The front lines held as Sirsky planned a decisive blow. Having observed the movement of Russian forces from south to north without much resistance under the command of Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner group, Chirsky realized the high price the Russians were paying for small advances in the Donbass. This build-up of Russian forces and casualties left other areas vulnerable.
When Chirsky found the most vulnerable point for an effective attack, he launched the attack without waiting for Washington’s approval. The Russians were caught off guard and weeks after the start of the operation, they were still struggling to reverse the situation in Kursk, which they had not successfully managed.
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