Ukraine says preparations for spring counteroffensive nearly complete. When it begins in the south, it marks a pivotal moment in the conflict. But the Russians had nearly six months to prepare the ground — and develop an elaborate defense package. Overcoming them can be a huge challenge.
Satellite images analyzed by CNN and other news organizations show the extent of Russian defenses — built in anti-tank ditches, roadblocks, mines and trenches — in parts of southern Ukraine.
Defenses continue along the southern flank, which stretches for hundreds of kilometers – and Ukrainian forces are expected to focus their counteroffensive in the coming weeks.
The challenge for the Ukrainians is to get around or bypass these obstacles very quickly, creating momentum to eliminate Russian command and control.
Several satellite images shared with CNN by Maxar Technologies, taken on Wednesday, show wide trenches east of the town of Polohy in the Zaporizhzhia region. A Reuters analysis of the images found thousands of defensive positions across the vast area.
According to a Reuters analysis, “Russia’s positions are concentrated near the front lines in the southeastern part of Zaporizhia, to the east and on a narrow strip of land connecting the Crimean peninsula with the rest of Ukraine.”
Defensive trenches in the Zaporizhzhia region. Satellite image ©2023 Maxar Technologies
Russian defenses include, for example, anti-tank ditches near Bolokhi stretching 30 kilometers, as well as additional fortifications around important towns such as Dokmok. This area will be critical if Ukrainian forces advance towards the city of Melitopol and attempt to cut off Russian forces in the south.
Maxor’s Stephen Wood says these defenses reflect a large swath of territory in the south, from Crimea to the Donetsk region.
CNN previously reported on the construction of defensive fortifications in northern Crimea.
Crimea’s Russian-appointed leader, Sergei Aksyonov, said earlier this month that his armed forces had “built a modern and deeply fortified defense”.
Months of preparation
The defenses began to emerge after Russian forces withdrew from part of the Kherson region in November and established a new defensive line across much of rural southern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense said in November that two factories were producing concrete barriers for tanks known as “dragon’s teeth”.
However, these defenses are only as good as the forces assigned to each sector. By themselves, they are a limited obstacle. That’s why the Russians are sending more units to southern Ukraine. These defensive lines formed the basis of their overall objectives.
Ukrainian authorities have received frequent reports from residents of occupied areas such as Mariupol and Berdyansk of long Russian convoys passing through and dozens of buildings being taken over as military shelters.
A large Russian base in northern Crimea that was filled with equipment including artillery and tanks in February was largely empty by the end of March and completely empty last week, satellite images showed. It is unclear where the equipment went, but it may have been sent north to reinforce Russian defensive lines.
A Russian base in Crimea, once full, is now nearly empty. Satellite image ©2023 Maxar Technologies
Even so, it is exceptionally difficult to say how many Russian troops – and of what quality – were assigned to each section of such a long front line. Disrupting supply lines, destroying ammunition depots, and attacking fuel infrastructure (among other tasks) will be critical before the Ukrainians attack.
This will make it very difficult for Russian troops to position themselves.
The Ukrainians will assess Russia’s weaknesses, as dynamics will be critical when the counter-offensive begins.
No surprises
Ukrainian officials have realized that they will not have the element of surprise in any major counterattacks, unlike the surprise bombing of much of the Kharkiv region in September.
Russian officials in Zaporizhia say Ukrainian forces are already building up significantly in the area. Several new Ukrainian regiments are expected to reach the front lines by the end of the week, Vladimir Rokov, head of the “We are together with Russia” organization in Zaporizhia, said on Thursday.
“These forces are being transferred to the 12,000 fighters in the area,” Rokov said.
His claim could not be verified and Ukrainian authorities did not publicize the movement of their units.
NATO says 98% of combat vehicles promised to Ukraine are already in the country and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said on Friday that preparations for a counter-attack were almost complete.
Aerial view of Russian defenses. Satellite Image ©2023 Maxar Technologies
But Ukrainian units must master combined arms maneuvers with this new equipment, including demining, clearing obstacles for tanks and building bridges with their assault battalions. It is a complex integration.
The US aid package announced in March included armored bridge-laying vehicles (AVLB) with advancing units – as well as demolition ordnance (mines).
And to be successful, they need to work with better coordination and communication. Some analysts have compared what the Ukrainians had to do to the D-Day landings, with German General Erwin Rommel saying at the time: “The first twenty-four hours of the invasion will be decisive for the Allies and for Germany. It will be a very long day.”
Franz-Stephen Gaddy, a London-based expert on modern warfare, expects the Ukrainian mission to “paralyze the Russian military leadership and instill panic in the Russian ranks.” “Intangible factors such as tactical surprise, battlefield leadership and fighter morale can be decisive in the first 24 hours of an attack.”
In an ideal scenario, he observes, “Ukrainian armored columns would break through Russian defenses at a weak point and quickly advance to the Russian rear, threatening command and control chains such as military headquarters and distribution centers”.
But the risk for Ukrainian forces, according to Matthew Schmidt, a professor of national security at the University of New Haven in the US, is that the counterattack will become “a fragmented battle with a lot of skirmishes between platoons,” and the Ukrainians will be held back.
He explains that mastery of combined arms — using different means of coordination — will be critical. “Attack supply depots in the rear, clear mines quickly, coordinate fires and move from platoon to platoon.”
Ukrainians have the advantage of being able to choose where and when to go and with what concentration of forces. Rokov, the Russian-appointed officer in Zaporizhzhia, said he expected the Ukrainians to launch several diversionary attacks to try to confuse Russian defenses, particularly using small reconnaissance parties along the Dnipro River in both Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
Once the attack begins, other factors may come into play: from the weather to the Russians’ ability and willingness to counterattack, which will go through the air component.
A Russian counterattack?
One of the characteristics of a successful defense is the ability to counterattack, to balance the enemy’s advance and force him to send troops where he does not want to. The ability of the Russians to do this effectively is questionable. Elite forces such as Western explorers, Russian paratroopers suffered heavy losses at the start of the campaign, from which they have yet to recover.
“Despite the tactical adaptations we’ve seen from the Russians, we’re yet to see them make an operational breakthrough during the 2023 offensive,” says Mick Ryan, a former Australian general who writes the military strategy bulletin Futura Doctrina. Ukraine.
But the Russians retain a distinct advantage in the air, which is crucial in halting Ukraine’s advance. Ryan notes that the Russian Air Force has increasingly used weapons to evade Ukrainian air defenses. Dead end (giving ground troops time to escape), such as the 1.5-ton glide bombs recently deployed around Bagmut.
“Not only do these increase the survivability of the aircraft, but they are much more difficult to intercept,” explains Ryan.
Despite the greater ingenuity and motivation of the Ukrainians, and despite the surprising losses of the Russians since the start of the invasion, Moscow maintains vastly superior resources in the conflict.
“In the long term, the Ukrainian military will find it difficult to survive this artillery-centric ground war,” Cady notes.
Even as they breach Russian borders and reach Melitopol and Berdyansk, there is little expectation among Western officials that Russian President Vladimir Putin will change his intentions in Ukraine.
Schmitt argues that military force only works when it induces a political effect. “That means Putin needs a big loss so he can’t explain it, which would be taking Crimea.”