How Ukraine defied the odds – and could still beat Russia

Analysis | After nearly a year of war, Ukraine is asking for more ammunition — and Russia is rushing to a new mobilization and offensive.

“When they attack us, they will see our face. Not our backs, but our faces.

These were the words of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 24, 2022, hours after Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion.

They were prophetic. Many analysts expected the Ukrainian opposition to crumble within days. But for a year, the Ukrainian army faced a much larger force, pushed back early Russian gains in Kharkiv and Kherson, and held the lead in the hotly contested Donbass region.

In the process, the Ukrainians inflicted staggering losses on the Russian army and exposed the antiquated tactics, outdated leadership and weak morale of a force more impressive on the march than on the battlefield.

In contrast, Ukrainian units proved agile and adaptable, leveraging drone technology, decentralized command, and intelligent operational planning to exploit their adversary’s organizational weaknesses.

Few would have bet that a year after this war, the ancient Ukrainian Air Force would still be flying.

One of the most impressive examples of Ukrainian agility came on the first day of the invasion, when a large Russian helicopter gunship seized an airfield on the outskirts of the capital, Kiev, threatening to turn it into a decisive bridgehead. The force will have more reinforcements.

The following night, Ukrainian special forces, backed by precision artillery, infiltrated the base, killing dozens of Russian paratroopers and disabling the airbase. The concept of Russian operations, so confidently rehearsed on the table, collapsed in its first phase.

The move underscored Zelensky’s determination (“I need ammunition, not a ride,” he said while rejecting a U.S. offer to evacuate Kiev), as well as the challenge of a small faction on Snake Island responding in vernacular to the Russian warship, a gesture that became a national monument within hours.

A month later, the Russian column, crawling along the highways north of Kiev, retreated, as did the battalions east of the capital. Moscow described the redeployment of troops as a “gesture of goodwill”. But it was the first of many revisions to Russia’s battle plans, highlighted by regular command changes and equally regular nose-wringing among military bloggers.

Ukrainians’ agility was bolstered by infiltrations of Western military equipment, superior to Russian supplies. First, British and American anti-tank weapons and Turkish attack drones helped block the Russian push toward Kiev, crushing the flanks of exposed columns and ambushing vulnerable points along their lines of approach.

Then came precision HIMARS missile systems, long-range artillery from France, Poland and elsewhere, which allowed Ukraine to sink Russian command posts, ammunition depots and fuel depots. Real-time intelligence gathering and fusion (backed by NATO) was coordinated, creating a battlefield where Ukrainian units found targets faster than Russian forces.

Air defense systems repelled Russian missile and drone barrages and discouraged its air force from conducting direct missions into Ukrainian airspace.

But there are frequent and costly delays in getting Ukrainians what they want. As one Ukrainian official told CNN this month, “We needed help yesterday, we promise tomorrow. The difference between yesterday and tomorrow is the lives of our people.

The latest iteration of the gap is the struggle to deliver tanks after months of evasion. Leopard 2s, Challengers and Abrams M-1s are reserved for Ukraine and are far superior to Russian main battle tanks. But the numbers are unclear – from a few dozen to 300 – and even a single Tailwind, the former will not be in the field until April, and then must be consolidated into battle groups in a unified formation, ready to carry the fight. Ultimately the enemy.

“We need ammunition”

But on this first anniversary of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has more needs than main battle tanks. During the CNN team’s two-week trip to the front lines, one refrain echoed over and over again: “We need ammunition.”

Last week a Ukrainian soldier appeared on television and said: “We need ammunition, ammunition and more ammunition.”

While Ukraine absorbs and trains with Western military hardware, the country tries to wage war with Soviet-era armored vehicles, scouring the world for large quantities of ammunition and spare parts. The “ammunition shortage” is its Achilles heel, Russia’s vast reservoir of artillery and missile systems.

“It is clear that we are in a logistical race,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said last week.

Ukraine’s shopping list can be divided into now (ammunition, more air defenses, long-range missiles and rockets) and next (tanks, Patriot batteries and small-diameter ground-delivered bombs called GLSDB, with range). Almost 160 kilometers, which was promised by the US).

Perennial risk is “late”.

One lesson the Russians have learned is to put logistics centers beyond the range of attacks, so the delivery time of the UK’s promised GLSDB and long-range systems is crucial – to defeat precision.

The Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies expects “the first GLSDBs will not arrive until this fall, potentially missing the widely anticipated Russian and Ukrainian offensives that will determine the future course of the war.”

Besides “now” and “next,” Ukrainian officials are frustrated by the “never” scenario, which currently includes F-16 fighter jets and US ATACMS missiles with a range of 300 kilometers.

Ukraine’s allies have refused to offer anything that would allow Ukraine to reach inside Russian territory, a red line formally drawn by Moscow.

“We need ammunition,” the CNN team said during the tour.

The Kremlin outlines its next steps

During a surprise visit by US President Joe Biden to Kiev on Monday, Zelensky said he expected the war to end by the end of 2023.

While the first year of the conflict has brought many surprises, the coming weeks are likely to bring an even more intense Russian offensive along the front line from Kharkiv to Zaporozhye – to fulfill the Kremlin’s aim of capturing the rest. Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Some Western officials believe that the Russian air force – which is not yet operational – will become the most important element of the Russian war plan. “We know that Russia has a significant number of aircraft and a lot of capabilities,” US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said last week.

As the prelude to the offensive began, the Russian high command may not have been encouraged: repeated attempts to advance into the Wuhleder area (perhaps a laboratory for a wider campaign) had gone awry.

The Kremlin’s failure to claim even Bakmut before the anniversary is a reminder that the Russians are more capable of wreaking havoc than conquering territory. Effective combined arms operations eluded the Russian battalions.

Senior US, British and Ukrainian officials told CNN they doubt Russia has built up the manpower and resources needed to make significant gains.

When Russian forces moved ahead of readiness due to political pressure from the Kremlin, “it’s probably more aspirational than realistic,” a senior U.S. military official said last week.

Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov was put in direct charge of the Ukraine campaign last month, prompting RAND analyst Tara Massicot to say, “The Russians can’t afford to listen to their exhausted might and deal with it. Hyperbole.”

After mobilizing 300,000 men, what is the Kremlin’s next step if this long-awaited offensive fails?

If past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, Putin will redouble the pressure. Perhaps an (unannounced) second mobilization, new missile strikes aimed at disabling Ukrainian infrastructure, and even efforts to defuse the conflict. The United States has warned of Russian attempts to destabilize Moldova in southern Ukraine, allegations Moscow has denied.

The only instruction book that worked for the Russians in this conflict was to destroy everything in front of them so there was nothing to defend. We saw this in Severodonetsk, Lysisansk, Popazna and above all Mariupol.

If Russia were to capture the Ukrainian-held region of Donetsk, it would have to demolish an area the size of Connecticut. [quase tanto como a área somada de Minho e Trás-os-Montes]. According to Ukrainian and Western official sources, there are already problems with the supply of ammunition to the Russian front lines.

A successful counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces, particularly a push south through Zaporizhia toward Melitopol, would raise the stakes for the Kremlin even higher.

In September, Putin warned, “If there is a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to protect Russia and our people, we will definitely use all the weapons systems at our disposal. It’s not nonsense.

Russia considers Melitopol and much of southern Ukraine to be Russian territory after holding fake referendums in the fall.

But Ukraine will need time to mobilize tanks, combat vehicles and other military hardware to break through Russian lines that are deeper and thicker than they were a few months ago.

It is possible, even probable, that the conflict will return to a violent stagnation after the eruption of fury this spring, with little significant change amid relentless attrition and high casualties.

The Ukrainian national anthem dreams “Our enemies will vanish like snow in the sun…”

Probably not in 2023.